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The article first gives an overview on the international standards relevant to the right of 
national minorities to participate in public life, especially to minorities’ representation in 
legislative bodies. International instruments, OSCE and Council of Europe expert 
recommendations recognize various procedures that may guarantee for minorities an effective 
participation in public life: there is not any specific requirement to grant minorities 
representation in national parliament. Both in Hungary and in Italy in the past decade there 
have been substantial electoral law reforms and different solutions have been introduced for 
facilitating the parliamentary representation of minorities. In Hungary the new model of so-
called nationality (minority) advocates offers representation in parliament without voting 
rights for all recognized minorities. In Italy the territorially concentrated autochthonous 
minorities get legally granted facilitation in gaining a seat in parliament. Nevertheless both 
arrangements leave open many questions regarding equality among minority communities, 
the principle of equal voting rights, and the effectiveness of minority representation in 
parliament. 
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1. International Standards on Political Participation of Minorities 
Amongst the other widely acknowledged cultural, linguistic or educational 
minority rights, the right of persons belonging to minorities to participate in 
public life has also gained a strong legitimacy under international law during the 
1990s.1  
In line with the individual language of existing human rights standards, the 
right of persons belonging to minorities to take part in decision-making without 
any discrimination was recognised as a cornerstone element in this context. The 
crucial international human rights documents guarantee to all citizens the right 
to participate in their country’s political life, as Art. 21 of the Universal 
                                                             
1 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE, 29 June 1990. Available at www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304; European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages of 5 November 1992 (in force 1 March 1998) ETS 148.; 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1 February 1995 (in force 
1 February 1998) 2151 UNTS 243. 
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Declaration of Human Rights2 formulated that: “1) Everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives. 2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his 
country. 3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures.” 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights4 contain similar provisions. However these 
commitments only recognise the prohibition of discrimination without any 
minority-specific dimension.  
The specific right to participation in the public life of minorities has been 
formulated in the international documents on minority rights since the 1990s. 
Looking at the deep concerns of states on this issue, it is not surprising that these 
documents use a rather general and cautious language. For example Art. 15. of the 
FCNM reads as: “The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and 
economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.”5 This 
provision does not say anything about how such participation should be 
guaranteed or what are the “necessary conditions for the effective participation”. 
Ghai underlined that the functions of participation “may range from lobbying at 
one end to making decisions at the other”.6  
In a European context, there are two key documents which may help in 
interpreting minorities’ rights to participation: In 1999 the OSCE HCNM 
published the Lund Recommendations and the FCNM Advisory Committee also 
issued a detailed commentary on the question.7 It seems to be clear that political 
rights are essential for the protection and promotion of group interests. This 
implies that people belonging to minorities should not only have the right to full 
equality before the law in their political rights without any form of discrimination 
but it also sheds light on their special needs in influencing public affairs. “Having 
a voice” in public affairs may be interpreted on a broad scale from presence, and 
consultative rights, to other forms of weak or strong influence on public affairs. 
Both expert documents stress the importance of “effective participation” in public 
life: i.e., minorities should have more participatory rights than just having the 
                                                             
2 GA/RES/3/217 A (III) 10 December 1948. 
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 16 December 1966 (in force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
4Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 
1950 (in force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221.  
5 Similar provisions are contained in other documents, e.g., para. 35 of the CSCE Copenhagen 
Document. 29 June 1990. Available at www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304 
6 Y. Ghai, Participation as Self-Governance, M. Weller (ed.) Political Participation of Minorities, 
Oxford, 2010, 616. 
7Commentary No. 2. The Effective Participation of Persons belonging to National Minorities in 
Cultural, Social and Economic Life and Public Affairs. adopted by the Advisory Committee on 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on 27 February 2008.  
ACFC/31DOC(2008)001 
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right to express their political opinions openly, either through freedom of speech 
or via voting rights. The FCNM Advisory Committee highlights the great variety 
of forms of effective participation, “such as exchange of information, dialogue, 
informal and formal consultation and participation in decision-making”.8 
Considering their participation in decision-making, the FCNM AC analyses 
various forms including special representation in organs of the state (executive, 
legislative, public service, etc.); electoral systems that ensure adequate 
representation; institutions for consultation; control or dominance of decision-
making processes; participation through sub-national forms of government and 
participation through autonomy arrangements, etc. It is quite obvious that these 
forms of participation are interpreted within the domestic realm.  
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in the 1999 Lund 
Recommendations elaborated a number of different forms of participation: Special 
representation in executive, legislative organs of the state; electoral systems that 
ensure adequate representation; mechanisms to ensure that interests of minorities 
are considered in state agencies and institutions to advise on minority issues; 
institutions for consultation; control or dominance of decision-making processes.  
States are free to choose from amongst the different institutional solutions 
as to the best fitting answer to the particular situation of minorities in their 
country. It seems to be clear that neither FCNM, nor other international 
instruments consider representation in legislative bodies as a sine qua non 
requirement for minorities’ effective participation in public life. Moreover, it is 
important to recall a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights on 
the admissibility of the complaint of the Südtiroler Volkspartei against the 1993 
electoral reform in Italy. The Commission concluded that states are not required 
to establish specific measures for political representation of minorities. The 
Commission noted that: “the electoral law in issue applies to all candidates and the 
Convention does not compel the Contracting Parties to provide for positive discrimination 
in favour of minorities.”9 
Against this background, participation in elected bodies at national level 
depends exclusively on domestic legislation. National parliaments are not only the 
main legislative bodies but also the core institutions of political representation. 
But it is also important to note that the FCNM, just like relevant OSCE documents 
use the term “effective participation”, so if participation of minorities in national 
parliament is granted or facilitated, it could also be expected to provide an effective 
tool for minorities to participate in decision-making. Measuring effectiveness in 
this regard is still open to debate. 
In the followings the general conditions of the representation of minorities 
in national legislative bodies will be explained and the relevant legal regulation in 
Hungary and Italy will be analysed. Both countries have a long legal history of 
                                                             
8 Ibid. 
9The European Commission of Human Rights Decision on the Admissability of Application 
No. 25035/94 by Silvius MAGNAGO and SÜDTIROLER VOLKSPARTEI against Italy, 15 
April 1996 
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minority rights protection measures, and both countries have recently adopted 
specific provisions for minorities’ parliamentary representation.  
2. Participation in Elected Bodies 
Participation in the work of the parliament is exceptionally important for 
minorities. Under the general rules of electoral procedures, minorities usually face 
difficulties in gaining seats in the parliament as small minority communities 
cannot mobilize enough voters to pass the threshold, or in other cases the minority 
community itself may be politically weak and passive.  
States can help and facilitate the representation of minorities in parliament 
through various measures. The measures targeting directly and exclusively 
minorities in this aspect shall be distinguished from general rules applying to 
other social groups. In Europe, we may assume that the basic requirements for 
political participation (such as citizenship, the right to vote and stand for election, 
freedom of association) are granted also for members of minorities. In exceptional 
cases, there is no need for further measures to guarantee seats in parliament for 
minorities. In North Macedonia or in Montenegro, Albanian minorities produce 
different competing parties through electoral competition. In other cases, 
minorities are pushed to create so-called umbrella parties based upon the strategy 
of “unity towards the outside with simultaneous differentiation within”10 – this is 
the case of the Südtiroler Volkspartei in Italy or the RMDSZ - Democratic Alliance 
of Hungarians in Romania.  
In any case, the selection of electoral system is crucial and three big groups 
of systems can be distinguished: plurality-majority systems, semi-proportional 
systems and proportional systems. The plurality-majority system is based on a 
‘winner-takes-all’ approach. This election system is usually disadvantageous for 
minorities and they will be left out from parliament, except for the case when they 
live in overwhelming majority in some of the electoral districts. But even in such 
cases affirmative ethnic-national gerrymandering11 may be an appropriate tool for 
facilitating minority representation in parliament. Proportional systems focus on 
representativeness and may be able to appropriately reflect the ethnic composition 
of the population. Plurality-majority systems tend produce a strong and stable 
majority for government whilst proportional systems tend to produce, often 
fragile, coalition governments. However minority parties can get better involved 
in coalition governments and in this way may also participate in the executive 
decision-making.  
Finally, semi-proportional electoral systems are a mid-way between the 
proportionality of proportional electoral systems and the majoritarianism of 
plurality-voting systems. However,  in any case for demographic reasons, none of 
the above mentioned electoral systems can per se guarantee the representation of 
                                                             
10 Ibid., 390. 
11 Here I use the term affermative ethnic-national gerrymandering as a reformulated term of 
the racial gerrymandering, used in many cases in the USA for designing electoral districts with 
Afro-American majority. 
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minorities in parliament, simply because most minority communities are too small 
to gain enough votes to get seats in parliament.12 In this context minorities need 
special measures to grant them representation in parliament. However, not all 
states adopt such measures: either for constitutional restrictions or because the 
politically most ‘important’ minorities are already represented by their minority 
parties in the parliament. Furthermore, majority political parties may include 
persons belonging to minorities on their list of candidates. Mainstream parties 
may put minority representatives on their list either out of political calculation or 
because some candidates have multiple identities or a personal vocation to 
represent a minority.13 There are voting systems which even promote the 
integration of minority interests. The integration of minority representatives in 
general political parties can also be motivated by putting persons belonging to 
minorities on eligible places on party lists. Moral or political deals between parties 
and minority organisations might exist in setting quotas for minority candidates.14  
2.1. Preferential measures for minority representatives 
In states, which recognise ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, there can be 
special mechanisms in place to guarantee or promote minority representation in 
the parliament. The possible measures include reduced requirements for 
registration; privileged funding for minority parties; favourable delimitation of 
constituencies; lowered threshold and reserved seats. Electoral systems based on 
proportional representation frequently include provision for a certain threshold 
that must be passed by a party in order to enter the parliament. It is a logic element 
to favour political stability, stable government majority and to avoid a breakage 
of parliament into extremely small political groups, which could hinder the 
efficient work of the legislature. Thresholds always represent a challenge for 
minorities, especially when they represent only a small percentage of the 
population. As a matter of fact, minorities may be deprived of any political 
representation by their own minority parties if thresholds are applied without any 
modification. Thresholds may be even defined purposely for excluding certain 
minorities from the parliament e.g., the 10% threshold in Turkey, effectively 
introduced to prevent Kurdish parties to enter in parliament.  
In order to overcome this problem, many States apply a specific threshold 
for minority parties at national parliamentary elections. For example in Poland, 
minority parties are completely exempt from the voting threshold.15 However 
such exemptions have to be justified because they may be seen as privileging 
minorities and offering “stronger” political rights to them. Marko argues this is 
not necessarily the case as the introduction of a threshold itself represents an 
                                                             
12See ibid. p. 390-392.  
13 C. Casonato, La tutela delle minoranze etnico-linguistiche in relazione alla rappresentanza politica: 
un’analisi comparata, Trento, 1998, 4. 
14W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford, 1995, 133-134. Cfr. also A. Verstichel, 
Participation, Representation and Identity. Antwerp, 2009, 399-400.  
15 L. A. Pap, Representation or Ethnic Balance: Ethnic Minorities in Parliaments, in Journal of 
Eastern European Law, 2000, 261-339. 
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exemption from the strict proportionality principle. The logic of thresholds is to 
prevent “too small” parties from parliamentary representation to guarantee 
government stability. In Marko’s line of reasoning, this logic does not legitimize 
the exclusion of minority parties by threshold requirements. The exemption from 
the exemption is not a privilege but a constitutional need under a proportionate 
electoral system. Under proportionate voting system, exemptions from electoral 
thresholds are a necessary condition to meet the demands of equal protection.16 
Some States have introduced the reservation of a certain number of seats in 
parliament for securing the representation of minorities. This measure is a real 
guarantee for effective minority representation in parliament and there are many 
different mechanisms to grant reserved seats. One important issue in this regard 
is the number of reserved seats compared to the size of assembly and in relation 
to the size of minority population. Another important question in this context the 
special voting rights assigned to the minority representatives. Verstichel 
identified different voting rights models in different countries.17 For example laws 
on issues affecting minorities or minority rights must pass with a qualified 
majority e.g., two thirds in Croatia. Even if due to their low number, minority 
representatives are not able to block the adoption of a law, it becomes more 
difficult to obtain a qualified majority and thus encourages compromise. Other 
voting rules might require a special voting, on a “cross-community” basis provides 
an effective veto right to all groups, see typical power-sharing arrangements, e.g. 
Belgium.18 Even small minority communities may have veto rights in parliament 
without a territorial power-sharing system. In Slovenia, the representatives of the 
Hungarian and Italian minorities, occupying reserved seats in parliament, based 
on Art. 64 of the Constitution, must give their consent to laws and other acts of 
the National Assembly which concern issues regarding the rights of minorities. 
These veto rights procedures are nevertheless in general considered to be a last 
resort because of the serious political complications that will entail.19 Moreover, 
veto rights do not resolve minority problems alone. As Marko pointed out this is 
true to the extent that minorities can only prevent laws from being adopted which 
would violate their interests but cannot force laws to be adopted in their 
interests.20 
In this broader context, it is interesting to see the specific provisions aimed 
at facilitating the parliamentary representation of minorities in Hungary and in 
Italy. 
                                                             
16J. Marko, General Presentation on the Representation and Participation of National Minorities in 
Decision-Making Processes, 2 December 1997, www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Minorities/ 
1._GENERAL_PRESENTATION/PDF_JP%20Brdo%20publication%201997.pdf 
17Verstichel, op. cit., 431. 
18 F. de Varrennes, Towards Effective Political Participation and Representation of Minorities, UN 
Working Paper, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC5/1998/WP4 
19 Verstichel, op. cit., 433. 
20 J. Marko, General Presentation on the Representation and Participation of National Minorities in 
Decision-Making Processes, 2 December 1997, www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Minorities/ 
1._GENERAL_PRESENTATION/PDF_JP%20Brdo%20publication%201997.pdf 
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3. Hungary and the Representation of Minorities in Parliament  
In Hungary, the situation of minorities was seen as an important political issue 
since the 1989 political transition,. The first law on minority rights was adopted 
in 1993 and the intention behind the 1989 constitutional regulations on minorities 
and the subsequent Act 77 of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities 
(Minority Act), was to find a solution for the particular situation of a large number 
of small, scattered, in large part assimilated national minorities and the significant 
Roma community a divided community, dispersed throughout the territory of the 
country.21 Furthermore while all other minorities are well integrated into society, 
Roma often live in socially marginalized communities, in suburban areas and often 
face discrimination in different areas of everyday life. The primary goal of the 
legislator was not to offer a general remedy to all problems related to minorities 
but much more to establish appropriate institutional structures for guaranteeing 
the survival of minority identities, cultures, languages and assuring the political 
participation of minority communities.22 The leading principle was to offer a 
chance to these weak communities to revive their identity, to organise themselves 
and to preserve their culture and language. The aim of minority policy in the new 
democratic Hungary was adjusting assimilation processes characterising previous 
periods.  
3.1. Cultural autonomy and political representation 
The explicit aim of the Minority Act was the establishment of a personal cultural 
autonomy (Arts. 21-54).23 The organizational consequence of this, and thus the 
essence of the entire regulation, is a system of minority self-governments endowed 
with legal status. In principle minority self-governments are designed by the law 
as legitimate representative bodies of minority communities, elected by the 
members of that community. They are invested with administrative and political 
powers to run minority institutions, to consult with state authorities and to 
participate in decision-making on issues relevant for minorities.24 
                                                             
21 The Roma community in Hungary is composed of three main groups, according to their 
mother tongue the Hungarian-speaking Romungro (89,6 per cent), the Romani-speaking 
Gypsy (4,7 per cent) and the Romanian-speaking Boyash (5,7 per cent) groups. E. Kállai, The 
Hungarian Roma Population During the Last Half-Century in E. Kállai (ed.) The Gypsies/the Roma 
in Hungarian Society. Budapest, 2002, 35-51. and I. Kemény, Linguistic Groups and Usage among 
the Hungarian Gypsies/Roma in E. Kállai (ed.) The Gypsies/the Roma in Hungarian Society. 
Budapest, 2002, 28-34.  
22 Cf.: Report submitted by Hungary pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of Minorities, 1999. Council of Europe, ACFC/SR(1999)010. 
PART ONE - Introduction.  
23 Personal cultural autonomy here means that all and only the members of a minority 
community are entitled to elect their autonomous body (or bodies) – having competence by 
law in cultural issues and for the political representation of the minority (both at local and at 
national levels). A fundamental element here is the principle of free choice of identity: every 
person is free to declare his/her minority identity and to participate in the political and 
cultural life of the minority community through cultural autonomy arrangements. 
24 Cfr. B. Dobos, Between Importing and Exporting Minority Rights: The Minority Self-
Governments in Hungary in L. Salat et al. (ed.), Autonomy Arrangements around the World: A 
Collection of Well and Lesser Known Cases, Cluj-Napoca, 2014, 275-298.; B. Vizi, Minority Self-
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Nevertheless, the 1993 Minority Act did not guarantee the parliamentary 
representation of minorities. Neither the electoral laws – prescribing a relatively 
high threshold of 5% – nor the Minority Act recognised the right of minorities to 
parliamentary representation.  
The Constitutional Court adopted a decision in 1992, that held that a 
constitutional omission has occurred when the political representation of 
minorities was not legally granted. The 1949 Constitution, in force until 2011, set 
forth under Art. 68 that “[t]he national and ethnic minorities living in the 
Republic of Hungary participate in the sovereign power of the people: they 
represent a constituent part of the State. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall 
provide for the protection of national and ethnic minorities and ensure their 
collective participation in public affairs, the fostering of their cultures, the use of 
their native languages, education in their native languages and the use of names 
in their native languages. (3) The laws of the Republic of Hungary shall ensure 
representation for the national and ethnic minorities living within the country.”25 
In 1992, before the adoption of the Minority Act, the Constitutional Court 
decision declared the omission, and in 1994,26, it once more reaffirmed this 
position, underlying that the recognition of minorities as state constituent 
elements entails their political representation.27 Apparently, the Court did not see 
the minority self-governments as appropriate political representative bodies. 
However this approach was rather ambiguous as it did not explicitly mention 
“parliamentary representation,” but referred to “general representation,” thus, the 
legislation in question could be regarded as completed by 1993. The obligation for 
parliamentary representation was stipulated by the 1993 Minority Act under Art. 
20 but was never actually instituted, and the debate remained open as there was 
no direct constitutional obligation on this issue. Furthermore Hungary was 
repeatedly criticized by international bodies and civil society actors for not 
meeting its self-induced obligations.28 The issue was lingering and dozens of 
consultations and meetings were held over the two decades since the 1989-1990 
political transition till 2011.  
Following the landslide victory of the right-wing FIDESZ at the 2010 
parliamentary elections, the new government obtained a solid two thirds i.e., 
constitutional majority in the Parliament. The new parliamentary majority 
wanted to change the post-transition political structures of the country and 
                                                             
Governments in Hungary - a Special Model of NTA? in T. Malloy – A. Osipov – B. Vizi (ed.) 
Managing Diversity through Non-Territorial Autonomy : Assessing Advantages, Deficiencies and 
Risks. Oxford, 2015. 31-52. 
25 Act 20 of 1949. 
26 Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities, Minority Rights Group 
International, & Serbian Institute of Budapest, “Submission to the 100th session of the Human 
Rights Committee: Shadow report to Hungary's fifth Periodic Report under the ICCPR” 
(2010). 
27 35/1992. (VI. 10.) AB határozat, ABH 1992, pp. 204–205. 
28A. L. Pap, Recognition, representation and reproach: New institutional arrangements in the 
Hungarian multiculturalist model in B. Vizi – N. Tóth – E. Dobos (eds.) Beyond International 
Conditionality, Baden-Baden, 2017, 103-110. 
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adopted a new constitution – the Fundamental Law.29 The new constitution 
introduced significant symbolic changes affecting also the position of minorities 
in Hungary. The term “minority” was replaced by the historical expression of 
“nationality”. In coherence with the new constitutional framework the 1993 
Minority Act was replaced by the end of 2011 by the Act on the Rights of 
Nationalities (hereafter Act on Nationalities).30  
The Act on Nationalities was adopted as a cardinal act i.e., requiring two-third 
majority in the parliament which maintains the traditional importance of minority 
issues in the Hungarian constitutional structure. The new law drew great attention 
both in Hungary and at international level. The Act on Nationalities did not change 
the fundamental principles of minority rights protection of the 1993 Minority Act, it 
is a more complex, a more detailed piece of legislation.31  
The Act on Nationalities puts a strong emphasis on the concept of cultural 
autonomy.32 The Act recognises collective rights and also autonomy as a 
manifestation of collective rights.33 In this sense the law distinguished cultural 
autonomy from nationality self-governments, it embodies a great variety of collective 
rights – including the establishment of a nationality self-government. The self-
government, as an elected body is rather the materialization of cultural autonomy, a 
representative forum and an administrative tool to realise cultural autonomy.  
The Act on Nationalities gives on different policy issues the right of 
consultation or the right of agreement to nationality self-governments, such 
rights are granted in relation to public education, cultural self-government 
affecting the nationality concerned (Arts. 27 and 33-49).34  
3.2. Parliamentary representation of minorities – from elected deputies to nationality 
advocates 
After several unsuccessful legislative attempts and a two-decade long political 
debate, for the first time since the 1989-1990 political transition, the second Orbán 
                                                             
29English version: The Fundamental Law of Hungary (adopted on 18 April 2011) < 
www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%2
0Hungary.pdf> (accessed on 07 April 2017) 
30 Act 179 of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities. 
31 Appendix 1 of the law lists the 13 nationalities which ex lege are entitled to collective rights, 
while for enjoying individual rights the law requires a subjective self-identification with one 
of these nationalities. The nationality communities recognised by law are the same as before: 
Bulgarian, Gypsy, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, 
Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian and Ukrainian.But this enumeration is not exclusive: the Act 
allows – in the same way as in the previous law – for any other minority group to apply for 
recognition as a minority if it fulfils the conditions under Art. 1 (2) and is supported by at least 
1000 citizens who profess to belong to it (Art. 148(3)). 
32 In this sense it is similar to the approach of the Croatian law on minorities. 
33 Art. 2. (3) „national a collective nationality right that is embodied in the independence of 
the totality of the institutions and nationality self-organisations under this Act through the 
operation thereof by nationality communities by way of self-governance” 
34 However this is not an absolute veto right, according to the law each parties have 30 days 
for issuing their opinion which may be postponed by another 30 days, after which if the 
nationality self-government did not declare its position the court may take a decision in 
substitution. 
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government adopted and actually implemented legislation that set forth the 
parliamentary representation (or at least, presence) of minorities. 
The Fundamental Law does not contain any specific provisions concerning 
the parliamentary representation of nationalities – it merely states that the 
participation of nationalities in the work of Parliament must be ensured. The 
detailed regulations are laid down in two laws on the electoral system approved 
by the Parliament in 2011 and 2013, respectively.35 Nationalities are entitled to 
win preferential seats in the 199 member Parliament as part of the contingent of 
93 seats that are distributed based on national lists. If any of the nationality lists 
wins a preferential seat then the seats that must be allocated between party lists 
will be reduced by the corresponding amount. Nationality lists can only be 
nominated by national-level nationality self-governments. This means that the 
parliamentary representation of minorities is based upon representation through 
minority self-governments, which implies that other players, such as parties, have 
no influence on the composition of the list and cannot nominate candidates. Only 
a single preferential seat can be won by each national minority and to win more 
than one seat, a nationality list can compete for additional seats based on the 
general election rules that require securing enough votes to take the five per cent 
threshold. The law does not recognise the expression of multiple identities – a 
citizen can choose to vote either for a party list nominated according to the general 
election rules or, if they is registered in the nationality voter roll, for one of the 
nationality lists. One can only enrol in one minority register. This provision is 
rather problematic because it forces the citizen to choose between their political 
preferences and their minority identity representation in the parliament. 
Nevertheless, the German minority community was successful in 2018 in 
mobilizing their electorate to elect the first member of parliament, representing a 
nationality community. 
According to the Act 36 of 2013 on Electoral Procedures, the rules for 
registering in the nationality voter rolls are not different from the rules applicable 
to nationality self-government elections – essentially, a principle of free self-
identification prevails in this context.36 According to the Act 203 of 2011 on the 
Election of the Members of Parliament, a national list can be nominated either as 
a regular party list or a nationality list. Nationality lists can be nominated by 
national-level nationality self-governments and such a nomination requires the 
endorsement of at least one per cent of nationality voters enrolled in the central 
registry, though the maximum necessary number is 1,500 subscription of 
supporting citizens. A candidate on the list must be someone who is also enrolled 
in the central registry as a person affiliated with the given nationality (national 
                                                             
35 Act 203 of 2011 on the Election of the Members of Parliament Articles 7-18., Act 36 of 2013 
on Electoral Procedure Articles 86-87. 
36 According to Art. 86 of the Act 36 of 2012 on the National Assembly requests for 
registration as a nationality voter shall contain: a) an indication of the nationality; b) a 
declaration by the voter, in which the voter professes to belong to said nationality; c) an 
indication of whether the voter also requests to be registered as a nationality voter with regard 
to the election of Members of Parliament. 
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minority), and, moreover, a list must contain at least three candidates. It is 
important to underline that the law does not allow for two or more national (level) 
nationality self-governments to nominate a joint list. In addition, all organizations 
representing minority interests, others than the nationality self-governments are 
excluded from the possibility of nominating lists for the parliamentary election. 
The law requires a minimum number of votes necessary to win a seat. According 
to the law, one quarter of the number of votes necessary for gaining a seat in the 
parliament for parties is required for minority lists. In 2014 and in 2018 it 
effectively implied that some 20,000 to 25,000 votes were needed for minority 
parliamentary representation. This is clearly a preferential number in respect to 
the generally applicable rules,37 nevertheless, given the demographics of 
minorities in Hungary, only the Roma and the German minorities have a chance 
at actually succeeding in passing this threshold.38 This means that for the other 
11 minority communities the nationality advocate remains the only option for 
parliamentary representation. 
3.3. Nationality advocates  
The legal status of the nationality advocate is now reviewed. The advocate just 
like a member of parliament representing a nationality, cannot be the president or 
member of a nationality self-government, even if they were  nominated by the 
latter.  
Article 18 of the Act 203 of 2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament 
reads as follows: “(1) Any nationality, which drew up a nationality list but failed 
to win a mandate by such list, shall be represented by its nationality advocate in 
Parliament. (2) The nationality advocate shall be the candidate who ranked first 
on the nationality list.” 
The nationality advocate may freely choose to take oath either in Hungarian 
or in their minority language.39 According to the Act 36 of 2012 on the National 
Assembly (Parliament), the nationality advocate may speak during plenary 
sessions but with certain limitations.40  
                                                             
37Art. 16, Act 36 of 2012 on the National Assembly. 
38 Imre Ritter, the candidate of the German Nationality Self-Government gained his 
parliamentary seat by getting 26477 votes in 2018, while only 5703 Roma voted for the Roma 
candidate. https://www.valasztas.hu/ 
39 Act 28 of 2008 on taking oath by elected public servants.  
40The House Committee (Házbizottság) is in charge of parliamentary procedures and is made 
up of the Speaker of Parliament, their deputies and the leaders of the parliamentary groups 
and they assesses whether a given issue pertains to the rights or interests of nationalities. The 
fact that the House Committee is vested with the right to decide whether a given item on the 
agenda affects the rights and interests of nationalities constitutes an obvious limitation of the 
advocate's powers. According to Act 36 of 2012 on the National Assembly Art. 11, within the 
framework of the provisions of the Rules of Procedure, the House Committee shall (…) specify 
the items on the orders of the day affecting the interests or rights of nationalities (…) 
According to Art. 13 the chair of the committee representing the nationalities may initiate 
with the Speaker the convening of the House Committee in the interest of the House 
Committee identifying an item on the orders of the day as an item affecting the interests or 
rights of nationalities. The Speaker shall decide on convening the House Committee. The chair 
or its deputy may attend the meeting of the House Committee in these cases. 
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The nationality advocate may even submit proposals for a decision to 
Parliament and submit questions to the government, members of the cabinet, the 
Prosecutor General, the president of the National Audit Office or the 
Commissioner of Fundamental Rights on issues pertaining to the rights and 
interests of nationalities.  
According to the Act on the National Assembly (Parliament), a 
parliamentary committee has to be set up specifically representing nationalities. 
This committee submits initiatives and proposals that serve the interests and 
rights of national minorities, issues opinions on relevant proposals, and is also 
involved in monitoring the government's work relating to nationalities.41 This is 
the only parliamentary committee in which the nationalities advocate is a voting 
member.42 The advocate and their status, apart from the limitations on their right 
to vote, and their competencies are limited to nationality affairs, is equal to that of 
other members of parliament e.g., they receives remuneration, has an expense 
account, enjoys immunity,.  
The nationality advocate, or a member of parliament who is a member of a 
nationality and obtained their seat as a nominee on a nationality list, may speak 
and submit bills and other documents in their native language. If Parliament or 
one of its committees takes up their proposal it is then debated in Hungarian. 
In general, the solution adopted by the Hungarian legislator for the 
representation of minorities is rather complicated. The electoral procedure is 
questionable as it has introduced severe limits to competition between different 
                                                             
41 Act 36 of 2012 on the National Assembly Art. 22 (1) The committee representing the 
nationalities shall be an organ of the National Assembly acting in the field of the interests and 
rights of nationalities, in charge of putting forward initiatives, making proposals, delivering 
opinions, and contributing to supervising the work of the Government, exercising the powers 
specified in the Fundamental Law, in Acts, in the provisions of the Rules of Procedure laid 
down in a resolution and in other resolutions of the National Assembly. (2) The committee 
representing the nationalities shall take a position on the report prepared by the Government 
on the state of the nationalities, and on the annual report of the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights. (3) The members of the committee representing the nationalities shall 
be the Members obtaining mandate from a nationality list, and the nationality advocates. (…) 
42Art. 29 (1) of the Act 36 of 2012 on the National Assembly: The nationality advocates shall 
have equal rights and obligations, they shall perform their activities in the interest of the 
public and the nationality concerned, and they shall not be given instructions in that respect. 
(2) The nationality advocate may speak at the sitting of the National Assembly if the House 
Committee considers that the item on the orders of the day affects the interests or rights of 
nationalities. In an extraordinary matter, following the debate on the items on the orders of 
the day, the nationality advocate may speak in the manner determined in the provisions of the 
Rules of Procedure laid down in a resolution. The nationality advocate shall have no right to 
vote at the sittings of the National Assembly. (3) The nationality advocate shall participate 
with a right to vote in the work of the committee representing the nationalities, and he or she 
may – on the basis of the decision of the chair of the standing committee or of the committee 
on legislation, or if the House Committee decides so in the framework of its decision according 
to paragraph (2) – attend, in a consultative capacity, the sittings of the standing committees 
or of the committee on legislation. (4) The nationality advocate may address questions to the 
Government, the member of the Government, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the 
President of the State Audit Office and the Prosecutor General about matters within their 
functions and affecting the interests or rights of nationalities. Section 29/A (1) The nationality 
advocate shall be entitled to immunity. The rules pertaining to the immunity of Members 
shall apply to the immunity of the nationality advocate. 
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minority organisations. The privileged position of the nationality self-
governments in the selection of candidates does not seem to be fair. Moreover, the 
legal position and the competencies assigned to the nationality advocates are also 
very complex and do not guarantee effective participation in the parliamentary 
decision-making process. In this context, it may be better to talk about the 
parliamentary representation of minorities rather than their participation in 
legislative competencies.43 
4. Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Italy 
The Italian Constitution only recognises linguistic minorities, as stated under Art. 
6. „The Republic safeguards linguistic minorities by means of appropriate measures.”44 
The omission of national or ethnic identity in this context reflects the particular 
approach of the Constituent Assembly in 1946-1947 who saw citizenship as a 
neutral and the only legitimate link between the individual and the state. This 
civic concept of the nation and the state was meant to see only one nation – the 
Italian as the only political community, a demos. However, at the same time it 
recognised different linguistic, cultural groups within the population. The legal 
measures mentioned in the Constitution were only aimed at the preservation of 
this cultural, linguistic identity. However the ’appropriate measures’ for a long 
time remained unclear. At regional level there have been attempts to safeguard 
the rights of linguistic minorities, especially in the regions having a special status 
under the Constitution. The Constitutional Court noted in its decision in 1975 
that “the principle of the protection of linguistic minorities (…) undoubtedly 
presents something different and something in more in respect to the equality of 
citizens (…) The protection of minorities (…) means (…) a need for a special, 
differential treatment in application of Art. 6. of the Constitution”.45 However, at 
the national level the Italian legislator adopted a specific law on the rights of 
linguistic minorities as late as 199946 focusing on the linguistic minority rights 
(hereinafter Act on Linguistic Minorities). In Italy there are as many as 12 
different minority groups living in very different regions each with a different 
social, demographic and administrative context.47 The particular situation of 
larger geographically compact minorities e.g., German speakers in South Tyrol, 
the Francophone community in Valle d’Aosta or the Slovene community in Friuli-
                                                             
43S. Móré, A nemzetiségi szószólói intézmény jogi kerete és működésének első két éve, in Parlamenti 
Szemle, 2016/2, 30-51. 
44 Constitution of the Italian Republic Gazzetta Ufficiale 27 dicembre 1947, n. 298, in English 
accessible at: 
<https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf> 
45 Corte costituzionale italiana 86/1975. Gazzetta Ufficiale 23 aprile 1975, n. 108.  
46 Act n. 482 of 15 December 1999. Gazzetta Ufficiale 20 dicembre 1999, n. 297.  
47 F. Palermo, – J. Woelk, Diritto costituzionale comparato dei gruppi e delle minoranze, Milano, 
2010, 281-316.  In total around 2,5 million people (cca. 4,5% of the population) belongs to 
traditional national or linguistic minorities. The 1999 Act on Linguistic Minorities under Art. 
2. recognises „to protect the language and culture of” Albanians, Catalans, Germans, Greeks, 
Slovenes, Croats and „those who speak French, Franco-Provancal, Friulan, Ladin, Occitan 
and Sard”. 
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Venezia-Giulia, is regulated under the special autonomous arrangements in place 
in these regions. In the case of the German and Slovene communities, there are 
also bilateral international treaties in force granting special rights to them. Indeed 
they are often called “superprotected minorities”, even if there are significant 
differences between their legal status and their specific rights. There is another 
group of minority communities which are recognised by the Act on Linguistic 
Minorities in a similar way but they live in ordinary regions and under very 
different legal protection measures.48 The Constitution focuses exclusively on the 
linguistic characteristics of minorities hence the protective measures adopted at 
national and at regional level show a great variability on how the special needs of 
minorities for participation in public, political life are reflected in legislation. The 
Italian Government in 1999, in its first report submitted to the Council of Europe 
under the monitoring procedure of the Framework Convention, listed a number 
of measures promoting the political representation of minorities: “As regards 
participation in political life, since Article 51 of the Constitution provides that “all 
citizens of either sex shall be eligible for public office and for elective positions on 
conditions of equality, according to the rules established by law”, other measures 
currently in force are designed to encourage the participation of the recognised 
linguistic minorities. The most important measures are the following: “Section 7 
of Law No 277 of 4 August 1993 establishes that the fixing of the single-member 
constituencies for the election of Deputies in the areas in which recognised 
linguistic minorities exist must facilitate their inclusion in the smallest possible 
number of constituencies. Section 7 of Law No 276 of 4 August 1993 makes the 
same provision in respect of the election of Senators. (…) Section 12 provides that 
it is possible to form unions between the various lists of candidates submitted by 
parties or political coalitions which represent those minorities. In addition, Section 
22 contains special rules on the allocation of seats between candidates from the 
linguistic minority’s list.”49 
In the past 20-25 years the Italian electoral system has been through 
substantial changes in various forms. Nevertheless, the preferential treatment 
afforded by the electoral law in 1993 was targeting large linguistic minorities 
living in regions with special status. The electoral law overlooked the problems 
related to the representation of small minority communities living in regions 
under ordinary statues. This particular distinction has not changed in the 
intervening time.  
4.1. Recent guarantees for linguistic minorities under the electoral system introduced by the 
2015-2017 electoral reforms 
In recent years, there has been a heated debate about the electoral system in Italy. 
The 2015 legislative reform on the electoral system – affecting only the elections 
                                                             
48 There are also other minorities, like the Rom and Sinti who are not recognised by the law 
at all. 
49Report submitted by Italy pursuant Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, 3 May 1999, ACFC/SR(1999)007 p. 73. 
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of deputies in the lower chamber – was adopted by the Act n. 52 of 6 May 2015 
(often referred to as Italicum).50 Like previous electoral legislation, since 2005 (so-
called Porcellum)51 this law  introduced a threshold for party lists and a double turn 
election mechanism, and a “winning premium” at national level for the winner 
party, aimed at securing a stable governing majority. Although the Constitutional 
Court found many provisions of the Act unconstitutional,52 the provisions relevant 
to the political representation of linguistic minorities remained unchanged by the 
Constitutional Court’s decision. The normative framework was rather 
disadvantageous for minorities, minority parties and minority candidates – the 
introduction of a threshold and a second round in the elections would make almost 
impossible for small minority communities to have any chance to gain a seat in the 
Parliament. The Constitutional Court’s decision on deleting a second round in this 
sense was seen as a positive development for minorities. Nevertheless, as a 
consequence of the Constitutional Court’s decision the parliamentary parties 
adopted new legislative regulations, finally reaching a viable and so-far durable 
consensus on the so-called Rosatellum53 (named after its drafter MP Ettore Rosato). 
One of the main questions under the new electoral system is the delimitation 
of electoral districts. In the regions of South Tyrol (Trentino Alto-
Adige/Südtirol) and Valle d’Aosta/Valleé d’Aoste, the Act creates single-member 
electoral districts. This kept in place the existing preferences for minority 
candidates in these regions. Strong minority parties in a single-member district 
are more easily able to win than in plurinominal districts. For the rest of the 
country, under the law the territory of the country shall be divided into 
plurinominal electoral districts. The delimitation of these districts however is 
required to take into account the geographic distribution of historical linguistic 
minorities (those listed in the Act on Linguistic Minorities). Article 3(1)d of the 
2017 Electoral Act states that the geographic delimitation of the electoral districts 
shall take into account the need to include minorities in as few districts as possible. 
Moreover, the same provision states under para. (1)e that in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
a plurinominal electoral districts should be created in a way to favour the access 
to parliamentary representation of the Slovene minority living there.54 The 2017 
                                                             
50Legge del 6 maggio 2015, n. 52 Disposizioni in materia di elezione della Camera dei deputati. 
Gazzetta Ufficiale, 8 maggio 2015, n. 105. 
51 Legge 21 dicembre 2005, n. 270 Modifiche alle norme per l'elezione della Camera dei 
deputati e del Senato della Repubblica. Gazzetta Ufficiale, 30 dicembre 2005, n. 303  
52 Communica Stampa della Corte Costituzionale, 25 gennaio 2017.  
53 Legge 3 novembre 2017, n. 165, "Modifiche al sistema di elezione della Camera dei deputati 
e del Senato della Repubblica. Delega al Governo per la determinazione dei collegi elettorali 
uninominali e plurinominali" 
54This provision was introduced by the so-called Italicum in 2015 and remained unaltered in 
the subsequent 2017 electoral law. Cfr. M. Monti, Rappresentanza politica preferenziale delle 
minoranze e uguaglianza del voto: considerazioni alla luce della recente disciplina del c.d. Rosatellum 
e del sindacato della Corte in materia elettorale, in Federalismi.it 2018, 2-3. 
https://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-documento.cfm?Artid=35838 and F. Guella, Le 
garanzie per le minoranze linguistiche nel sistema elettorale c.d. Italicum, in Rivista AIC 2015, 
www.rivistaaic.it/le-garanzie-per-le-minoranze-linguistiche-nel-sistema-elettorale-c-d-
italicum.html, 8-9. Provision in accordance with Art. 26. of the Act on Slovene Linguistic 
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Electoral Law relied on Italicum, when it introduced a new approach by requiring 
a favourable redrawing of electoral districts for minorities over the entire territory 
of country. It offers – even if rather slight – new chances for minorities living in 
ordinary regions to gain a seat at the parliamentary elections. Besides, the new 
law keeps also the preferential guarantees for the regions with special status, 
where special regional legislation provides protective measures for linguistic 
minorities. At counting the final results of the elections the electoral offices shall 
not take into account only those party lists that reached the 3% threshold at 
national level but in the regions with special statues also the party lists of 
minorities living in the region and reaching 20% of the votes in that region.55 The 
new electoral law intends to preserve the traditional representation of the South 
Tyrolean German speakers and the French speaking community of Val 
D’Aosta/Valleé d’Aoste. Both communities are large enough, well organised and 
politically mobilised to be usually able to gain seats in the Parliament. The fact 
that the new law specifies also the linguistic minorities (i.e. the Slovenian 
community) in Friuli Venezia Giulia in this aspect completes the list of regions 
with special statute, where potentially a linguistic minority may gain a seat in 
parliament (either in the Chamber and in the Senate) under preferential conditions. 
In fact, the special guarantees for favouring minority candidates in the regions 
with special statue seems to be a stable element in Italian electoral system.56 This 
means that the above-mentioned three minority communities get a political 
guarantee for parliamentary representation, i.e. the preferential electoral 
provisions offer only the possibility for minority candidates, they still need a 
substantive electoral support to gain a seat in parliament. 
5. Conclusions 
Both Hungarian and Italian constitutional systems recognise the specific 
needs of minorities to protect their identity. However, the two legislative systems 
translate this constitutional duty in a different way to the political representation 
of minorities at national level. The new constitutional structure, developed from 
democratic transition in Hungary gives a strong, but symbolic position to 
minorities recognising them as state constituent elements. The question of 
parliamentary representation of minorities was finally resolved in 2010 in a rather 
ambiguous way. Even under the preferential provisions in practice only the 
German and Roma minorities have a chance to gain a seat in parliament. The 
position of nationality advocates can hardly be seen as an effective tool for 
minorities to participate in decision-making, however it offers to all – irrespective 
                                                             
Minority. Norme a tutela della minoranza linguistica slovena della regione Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia. Gazzetta Ufficiale 8 marzo 2001, n.56.   
55 This preferential treatment was already introduced in 2005, by Art. 1(12) of the Electoral 
Act n. 270 of 21 December 2005. 
56 Elezioni politiche del 4 marzo 2018 – Il dossier. Ministero dell’Interno, Dipartimento per gli 
Affari Interni e Territoriali, Febbraio 2018, www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/ 
4_marzo_2018_dcse_dossier_politiche.pdf.  
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of their demographic size – minority communities a presence, a representation in 
the national legislative body.  
On the other hand, the Italian constitutional regime for a long time refrained 
from recognising the particular political needs of minorities, even if the large 
minority communities could regularly gain seats during the troublesome electoral 
history of democratic Italy without introducing special measures. The electoral 
reform introduced first by the Italicum in 2015 and later confirmed by the 
Rosatellum in 2017 takes also into account the special situation of minorities, 
however it does not establish a granted representation for minorities – it is limited 
only to a few preferential measures that favour territorially concentrated minority 
communities living in regions with special autonomy (namely French-speaking 
Val D’Aostans, German-speaking South-Tyroleans and Slovene-speakers in Friuli 
Venezia Giulia). In this way it offers a political guarantee for full parliamentary 
representation of these regional linguistic minorities, but separates these 
communities from other linguistic minorities, who do not have a chance for 
political representation in the national legislative body.  
Looking at the international legal norms on the matter and on the debates 
emerged in Hungary and Italy over the representation of minorities in parliament, 
it may still be concluded that minority rights related to the preservation and 
promotion of minority identity are closely related to the minority’s access to 
political representation in decision-making bodies. The constitutional recognition 
of the cultural, linguistic rights of minorities does not per se guarantee 
participation in political life. And if national legislation grants or facilitates 
minority representation in national parliament in any form it may easily lead 
either to an unbalanced distinction between different minority groups or to 
granted, but weak presence in decision-making body. Each state needs to find a 
balanced approach to solve the conundrums of equality, right to effective 
participation in political decision-making and the principle of non-discrimination. 
Italy and Hungary – based on their historical, political, social differences – adopted 
two different, but under international standards, equally viable solutions in this 
regard.  
 
